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V . C O N CLU SIO N ......................................................................................... 885
I. INTRODUCTION: PUTTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
PERSPECTIVE
Deciding upon the appropriate sentence for a person who has
been convicted of a crime is the routine work of judges. By
reason of this experience, as well as their training, judges pre-
sumably perform this function well. But, precisely because the
death penalty is unique, the normal presumption that a judge is
the appropriate sentencing authority does not apply in the capi-
tal context. The decision whether or not an individual must die
is not one that has traditionally been entrusted to judges ....
Juries - comprised as they are of a fair cross section of the
community - are more representative institutions than is the ju-
diciary; they reflect more accurately the composition and ex-
periences of the community as a whole, and inevitably make
decisions based on community values more reliably, than can
that segment of the community that is selected for service on
the bench.... [T]he belief that juries more accurately reflect the
conscience of the community than can a single judge is the cen-
tral reason that the jury right has been recognized at the guilt
stage in our jurisprudence. This same belief firmly supports the
use of juries in capital sentencing, in order to address the Eighth
Amendment's concern that capital punishment be administered
consistently with community values .... [Since] evidence indi-
cates that judges and juries do make sentencing decisions in
capital cases in significantly different ways . . . entrusting the
capital decision to a single judge creates an unacceptable risk
that the decision will not be consistent with community values.'
The debate over the issue of capital punishment is probably as old as
history itself. Indeed, it is an issue that goes to the very core of fundamental
human values. Some foreign countries have banned the practice for decades;
others have continued to endorse the procedure through political or religious
oppression. Similarly, the United States continues to struggle with this issue.
Even in the post-September 1lth era, where the war on terrorism continually
affects our culture, the moral issue of capital punishment continues to be a
I Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 476-89 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (citations omitted).
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highly controversial and debated issue.2 The problem with capital punishment is
that it is one of the few core issues in society on which almost every individual
has a moral,. philosophical, or religious viewpoint. In the midst of these pre-
conceived and usually sensitive opinions, it seems as if the reasons upon which
an individual should make an informed decision about the status of the death
penalty in our country fall on deaf ears.
In order to undertake an intellectual discussion of the procedural and
theoretical questions raised following a landmark capital punishment case such
as Ring v. Arizona,3 it is important to consider the context of the death penalty in
our society. There are currently thirty-eight states that allow for the death pen-
alty.4 Since 1976, 906 prisoners have been executed. 5 Recently, a 2003 year-
end survey of the death penalty showed that the punishment is in significant
decline.6 This conclusion is based on the facts that (1) there were only sixty-five
prisoners executed in 2003;7 (2) the total population of death row has declined
five percent to 3,504 since 2002;8 (3) the imposition of new death sentences has
decreased to approximately 139 in 2003; 9 and (4) public support for capital pun-
ishment has dropped to its lowest level since 1978.10 Additionally in 2003, ten
death-row inmates were exonerated and 174 death sentences were commuted.'I
In considering what has caused these recent declines, strong considera-
tion must be given to two landmark United States Supreme Court decisions of
2002. First, in Atkins v. Virginia, 2 the Court held that the imposition of the
death penalty upon mentally retarded inmates violated the Eighth Amendment's
2 For a detailed discussion of the specific issues created by capital punishment in the post-
September 1 th era, see Symposium, Capital Punishment in the Age of Terrorism, 41 CATH. LAW.
187 (2001).
3 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
4 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2004) [hereinafter
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.], at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf. The federal
government and the United States Military also permit the death penalty. Id.
5 Id. at 4. The overwhelming majority of these executions have been by lethal injection. Id.
6 RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2003: YEAR END
REPORT 1 (2003), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/YER-03-F.pdf.
7 Id. This represents an 8% decline from 2002 and a 34% decline from 1999. Id.
8 See id.
9 Id. at 1-2 (signifying almost a 50% drop from the late 1990s).
10 Id. at 2. "Support dropped from 70%... in October [of 2002] to 64% in October of [2003],
despite the media focus on the trials of two men accused of serial killings in Virginia and Mary-
land and continuing concern about terrorism." Id.
I d. at 1. It should be noted that 171 of these commutations came as a result of former Illi-
nois Governor George Ryan's decision in January of 2003 to clear death row in Illinois. Illinois
has since continued its moratorium on capital punishment. id. at 2-3.
12 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.' 3 The second case the Court decided
was Ring v. Arizona.14 In Ring, the Court held that a capital punishment sen-
tencing scheme that allowed a judge to balance aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances unconstitutionally violated a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial. 15 This decision, which will serve as the focal point of this
Comment, has widespread ramifications which include the possibility of affect-
ing the status of over eight hundred death sentences in eleven states.'
6
Prior to discussing the specifics of Ring v. Arizona, it is important to
consider the foundation of Arizona's capital punishment law. The Territory of
Arizona enacted its initial capital punishment statute in 1901.17 This statute
delegated the sentencing decision to a jury except in cases where the defendant
had pleaded guilty. 18 Abolished in 1916, the statute was subsequently resur-
rected in 1918.19 Thereafter, the 1901 sentencing scheme remained in effect
until 1972.20 In 1972, the United States Supreme Court invalidated these com-
plete discretion capital punishment schemes as unconstitutional in Furman v.
Georgia. 21
As a result of Furman, the Arizona Legislature approved a new capital
punishment sentencing scheme in 1973,22 which entrusted the sentencing deci-
sion to a judge.23 The statute outlined six aggravating circumstances and four
13 Id. at 321.
14 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed ... ").
16 See Press Release, Death Penalty Information Center, Supreme Court Requires Jury Partici-
pation in Death Sentences: Decision May Overturn Hundreds of Death Verdicts 2 (June 24, 2002),
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/PR-DPICRing.pdf.
17 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1102 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (citing ARIZ. TERRITORIAL
REv. STAT., tit. 8, §174 (1901)), cert. granted, in part, sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct.
833 (2003).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. (citing Hernandez v. State, 32 P.2d 18, 20-21 (Ariz. 1934)).
21 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22 See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK 1 (2004)
[hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK] (citing 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws 138,
§ 5, at 968-70), http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/sdocuments.nsf/394aO7a9e4816f718825-
68480080a9I a/$FILEfinal2004.pdf.
23 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1103. The 1973 scheme fundamentally changed the 1901 statute.
The 1901 scheme required the jury to make sentencing decisions in capital cases; the 1973 legis-
lation entrusted the sentencing decision to a judge. See id. at 1102-03.
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mitigating circumstances for judicial consideration.24 The death sentence was
permitted only when the judge found the presence of at least one aggravating
factor and no mitigating factors. 5 Six years later, another reform to the statute
was required following the case of Lockett v. Ohio,26 in which the United States
Supreme Court invalidated exclusive statutory lists of mitigating circumstances
in capital cases. 7 In response to Lockett, the Arizona Supreme Court found the
1973 statute unconstitutional because it prohibited a defendant from proving
mitigating circumstances not in the statute. 8
To address this problem, the Arizona State Legislature amended the
capital sentencing process in 1979 to permit a judge to consider any relevant
mitigating circumstances in the determination of whether to impose the death
penalty.29 This is the sentencing scheme that eventually became the center of
controversy in Ring v. Arizona.30 The Ring decision raises two broad concerns.
The first issue left unanswered by Ring is the practical implications associated
with a landmark case that strikes down capital punishment schemes in five
states.31 Second, and more importantly, the Ring majority did not address
whether the decision should be applied retroactively to prisoners awaiting exe-
cution.
Part II of this Comment will examine the three major United States Su-
preme Court cases that played a role in determining the constitutionality of the
sentence enhancement scheme at issue in Ring. Part III provides a factual and
procedural background of the Ring decision. In addition, this Part outlines the
conflicting opinions rendered by the Ring Court. Part IV assesses the impact of
Ring, specifically analyzing whether Ring should be retroactively applied. Fi-
nally, this Part also argues that the United States Supreme Court should apply
Ring retroactively based on Supreme Court precedents.
24 Id. at 1103.
25 Id. (citing 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws 138, § 5, at 966, 968-70).
26 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
27 Id. at 608-09. The Arizona Supreme Court had found the 1973 statutory list of mitigating
circumstances to be exclusive. See State v. Bishop, 576 P.2d 122 (Ariz. 1978), vacated, 439 U.S.
810 (1978).
28 See State v. Watson, 586 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ariz. 1978).
29 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1103. Various aggravating and mitigating circumstances were
added to supplement the statute from 1977 to 1985. Id. (noting changes in 1977, 1978, 1984, and
1985).
30 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
31 The Ring decision has the potential to affect a total of eleven states capital punishment
sentencing schemes. See infra Part. IV.
20041
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II. WALTON, JONES, AND APPRENDI: A PARADOX OF APPLICATION
A. Walton v. Arizona - Allowing Judges to Balance the Circumstances
In Walton v. Arizona,32 the defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder for robbing, kidnapping, and killing a victim with a firearm.33 Under the
applicable state statute,34 the trial judge held a sentencing hearing in order to
balance the "aggravating circumstances" presented by the State with the "miti-
gating circumstances" presented for leniency by the defendant.35 The trial judge
found "that [because] the two aggravating circumstances pressed by the State
were present .... [and because] there were 'no mitigating circumstances suffi-
ciently substantial to call for leniency"' the defendant should be sentenced to
death.36 After his conviction was affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court,37
38Walton petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
Walton claimed that the Arizona capital punishment statute violated the Sixth
Amendment by allowing a judge, rather than a jury, to balance the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and make the final sentencing hearing decision.39
A majority of the Court disagreed and upheld the statute, stating that
"the Arizona capital punishment sentencing scheme does not violate the Sixth
Amendment., 40 The Court, citing Clemons v. Mississippi 4 and Hildwin v. Flor-
ida42 compared the Arizona scheme to the Florida framework, which had previ-
32 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
33 See id. at 644-45.
34 See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-703(B) (1989) (current version as amended at ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703.01(A) (West Supp. 2003)).
35 See Walton, 497 U.S. at 645.
36 Id.
37 State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017 (Ariz. 1989), affd, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled in part
by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
38 See Walton v. Arizona, 493 U.S. 808 (1989).
39 See Walton, 497 U.S. at 647. It should be noted that Walton also claimed on appeal that the
statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by imposing an unconstitutional burden
of production, a preponderance of evidence, that the defendant show mitigating circumstances to
obtain leniency, id. at 649; that the effect of the statute was to "create an unconstitutional pre-
sumption that death is the proper sentence", id. at 651; and that one of the aggravating circum-
stances, for which he was attributed to have possessed, failed to attribute appropriate discretion to
the sentencer and its imposition was thereby applied unproportionally. Id. at 652-55. The Court
dismissed each of these arguments, finding that the statute did not violate the corresponding con-
stitutional provisions. See id. at 649-56.
40 Id. at 649.
41 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (citing the proposition that no prior Supreme Court decision had articu-
lated a requirement that the jury impose a death sentence).
42 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam).
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ously been upheld by the Court, and found that "'the Sixth Amendment does not
require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of
death be made by a jury."' 43 The Court dismissed Walton's efforts to distin-
guish the Arizona scheme from the Florida system.44 Specifically, the Court
refuted Walton's contention that the Arizona format applied the "aggravating
circumstances" as "'elements of the offense"' and explained that the circum-
stances acted as a mere guide to the trial judge.45 Furthermore, the Court relied
on its decision in Cabana v. Bullock46 and reasoned:
If the Constitution does not require that the Enmund finding
["that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to
kill '47] be proved as an element of the offense of capital mur-
der, and does not require a jury to make that finding, we cannot
conclude that a State is required to denominate aggravating cir-
cumstances "elements" of the offense or permit only a jury to
determine the existence of such circumstances.48
In his dissent, Justice Stevens questioned the majority's interpretation of
the Arizona capital punishment scheme. 49 First, Stevens theorized that because
the Arizona statute did not permit the application of the death penalty without
the finding of an aggravating circumstance, the aggravating circumstances did in
fact serve as elements of capital sentencing.50 Second, Stevens relied on English
common-law theory and the Supreme Court's early applications of the Sixth
Amendment for the principle that it was a jury's responsibility to assess the fac-
tual elements that decided the imposition of a capital punishment sentence. 5'
For these two reasons, the Arizona scheme in question was, in his opinion, un-
constitutional.
43 Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-48 (quoting Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640-41).
44 Id. at 648.
45 Id. (citing Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986)) (explaining that the presence of an ag-
gravating circumstance or lack thereof, does not establish a per se standard for the imposition or
preclusion of a death sentence)).
46 474 U.S. 376 (1986) (holding that an appellate court may constitutionally decide a defen-
dant's culpability and finding that this action does not impact the State's classification of a par-
ticular crime, nor in the instance of a capital crime, does it require additional elements to be rec-
ognized by a jury prior to a sentencing determination).
47 Walton, 497 U.S. at 648-49.
48 Id. at 649.
49 Id. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51 See id. at 710-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2004]
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B. Jones v. United States - The Foundation for Change
In Jones v. United States,52 the defendant and two accomplices were ar-
rested and indicted under federal law on two counts: using a firearm in relation
to a crime of violence and carjacking.53 Under the terms of the carjacking stat-
ute,54 the maximum sentence could be increased from fifteen to twenty-five
years "'if serious bodily injury... results."' 55 This provision was not included
in the indictment, and the district court instructed the jury on the fifteen-year
maximum sentence available. 6 After the jury returned guilty verdicts on both
charges, the Government presented a "presentence report," and it recommended
a twenty-five-year maximum for the carjacking charge (due to evidence that one
of the victims suffered significant injuries to his ear) in accordance with the
bodily injury provision of the carjacking statute.57 Despite Jones' objection on
the ground that the provision had never been pleaded at trial as an element of the
offense, the district court agreed with the Government's recommendation and
granted the twenty-five-year maximum sentence on the carjacking charge in
addition to a five-year sentence for the use of the firearm.58 On appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, Jones claimed that the sentencing process allowed the trial judge
to determine an element of the carjacking offense under the terms of the stat-
ute. 59 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the framework and
legislative history of the statute intended for the subsections to serve as "sen-
tencing factors" that could lead to increased penalties and not separate of-
fenses.60
The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari and
reversed.61 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, explained that the issue was
"whether the federal carjacking statute. . . defined three distinct offenses or a
single crime with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of them dependent
on sentencing factors exempt from the requirements of charge and jury ver-
52 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
53 See id. at 229-30.
5 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000)).
55 Jones, 526 U.S. at 230 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988)).
56 Id. at 230-31.
57 Id. at 231.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 231-32. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Eleventh Circuit Court Appeals' decision
in United States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004, 1009-10 (11th Cir. 1995). Id. It should be noted that
the Ninth Circuit vacated that portion of the district court decision that reduced Jones' total sen-
tence to twenty-five years. Id. at 232 n.2 (citing United States v. Oliver, 116 F.3d 1487 (9th Cir.
1997); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 555-56 (9th Cir. 1995)).
61 Jones, 526 U.S. at 232.
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dict. ''62 The Court explained that while it appeared from the face of the statute
that the subsections might be sentencing provisions, the increased penalty provi-
sions in subsections (2) and (3) were conditioned upon certain facts ("serious
bodily injury" and "death"). 63 Thus, the conditional provisions seemed to pro-
duce an effect similar to elements of the crime.64 Finding the statutory construc-
tion to be facially ambiguous, the Court focused upon other state and congres-
sional statutes for reference to guide its interpretation.65 After extensive consid-
eration, the Court found that while the subsections of the statute could poten-
tially be construed as either elements or sentencing factors, "the fairest reading
[of the statute] . .. treats the fact of serious bodily harm as an element. 66 To
find otherwise would result in serious constitutional ramifications.67 The Court
stressed that "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact ... that in-
creases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 68
After stressing the significance of allowing a jury to assess the facts that
are associated with specific elements of a crime,69 the Court addressed the dif-
62 Id. at 229 (citation omitted). At the time the petitioner was charged, the carjacking statute
specifically stated:
Whoever, possessing a firearm .. takes a motor vehicle that has been trans-
ported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person
or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to
do so, shall -
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury... results, be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of
years up to life, or both.
Id. at 230 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988 ed., Supp. V)) (citations omitted).
63 Id. at 232-33.
64 Id.
65 See id. at 234-37. The Court articulated that Congress had previously made serious bodily
injury an element of an offense of other statutes and that numerous states utilize it as an element
of aggravated robbery. Id. Furthermore, the Court specifically explained: "We thus think it is
fair to say that... Congress probably intended serious bodily injury to be an element defining an
aggravated form of the crime." Id. at 236.
66 Id. at 239.
67 See id. at 239-44. The Court opined, "If serious bodily injury were merely a sentencing
factor .... then death would presumably be nothing more than a sentencing factor ... [which
could cause] a jury finding of fact necessary for a maximum 15-year sentence ... [to] open the
door to a judicial finding sufficient for life imprisonment." Id. at 243-44 (citations omitted).
68 Id. at 243 n.6.
69 See id. at 243-48.
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ferences in its prior decisions permitting judicial factfinding in capital punish-
ment cases.70 The Court distinguished Spaziano v. Florida71 on the ground that
it did not involve a true factfinding assessment but rather a theoretical choice in
sentencing application. 72 The Court also distinguished Hildwin v. Florida73 on
the ground that the judge was only permitted to determine the existence of ag-
gravating circumstances after the jury had engaged in the factfinding process
and made a recommendation about the sentence.' 4 Finally, the Court briefly
distinguished its decision in Walton, finding its application inapplicably narrow
since the Walton Court had not labeled the assessment of aggravating circum-
stances as "raising the ceiling of the sentencing range., 75 By distinguishing
these cases, the Jones Court circumvented potential constitutional problems and
held that the challenged statute "establish[ed] three separate offenses by specifi-
cation of distinct elements, each of which must be charged by indictment,
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict., 76
C. Apprendi v. New Jersey - The Jury Must Make Sentence Enhancement
Determinations
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,77 the United States Supreme Court took its
reasoning one step further. In late December of 1994, Charles Apprendi fired
shots into an African-American household located in a predominantly white
neighborhood in Vineland, New Jersey.78 After his arrest, Apprendi stated that
even though he did not know the occupants of the house, he did not want them
in the neighborhood because they were black; Apprendi later retracted this
statement. 79 Apprendi was subsequently indicted on twenty-three offenses.80
He agreed to a plea arrangement whereby he entered a guilty plea for two counts
70 Id. at 248-51.
71 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
72 Jones, 526 U.S. at 250.
73 490 U.S. 638 (1989).
74 Jones, 526 U.S. at 250-5 1.
75 See id. at 251. This view has been criticized by several justices. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 538 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
76 Jones, 526 U.S. at 252.
77 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466. For an in-depth analysis of Apprendi and its impact, see gener-
ally B. Patrick Costello Jr., Comment, Apprendi v. New Jersey: "Who Decides What Constitutes a
Crime?" An Analysis of Whether a Legislature is Constitutionally Free to "Allocate" an Element
of an Offense to an Affirmative Defense or a Sentencing Factor Without Judicial Review, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1205 (2002).
78 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
79 Id. (quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 486 (N.J. 1999)).
80 Id.
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of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one count
of third-degree unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb in exchange for
dismissal of the remaining twenty counts. Under New Jersey law, the com-
bined maximum sentence for these three offenses was twenty-five years.82 Al-
though not referenced in the indictment, New Jersey also had a hate crime law
which allowed a trial judge to enhance the prison sentence if it was determined
"by a preponderance of the evidence, that '[t]he defendant in committing the
crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals
because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnic-
ity.' 83 The enhancement in this case, requested by the State for one of the pos-
session counts, had the potential to increase the prison term by ten to twenty
years. 84
According to the stipulations of the plea arrangement, the State main-
tained the privilege to demand that Apprendi's sentence be increased in accor-
dance with the hate crime statute.85 Concurrently, Apprendi preserved the right
to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.86 Following the plea agreement
hearing, the trial court accepted the guilty plea and proceeded to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine the factual applicability of the hate crime law.
87
Testimony was introduced by both sides, and Apprendi denied that his actions
were motivated by racial bias.88 However, the trial judge ruled "'that the crime
was motivated by racial bias.' 89 "Having found 'by a preponderance of the
evidence' that Apprendi's actions were taken 'with a purpose to intimidate'...
the trial judge held the hate crime enhancement applied .... [and] sentenced
him to a 12-year term of imprisonment on [the possession] count. ... ,90 Ap-
prendi appealed the decision on the grounds that it violated his Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process right to have the factual determination behind the is-
sue of bias decided by a jury, rather than a judge.9' The sentence was upheld by
81 Id. at 469-70.
82 See id. at 470.
83 Id. at 468-69 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000)).
94 See id. at 469.
85 Id. at 470.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 47 1.
89 Id. (citation omitted).
90 Id.
91 Id.
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the New Jersey appellate courts,92 but reversed on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.93
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, determined that the primary issue
was "whether the Due Process Clause ... requires that a factual determination
authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence.., be made by a jury
on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."94 At the outset, the Court
noted the significance of its opinion in Jones95 and reiterated the fundamental
principle that the Constitution implicitly requires a jury to find every element of
a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict a criminal de-
fendant. 96 Stevens articulated his distaste for an interpretation that would pro-
vide procedural safeguards for some acts and deny those same procedural safe-
guards for other acts merely because the latter acts were labeled sentence en-
hancements.97 The Court acknowledged its prior recognition of the historical
role of judicial discretion in implementing a particular sentence within the limits
of each statute and elaborated on the association between this discretion and the
jury's determination.98 Despite this judicial discretion, the Court relied largely
on the inherent dangers of depriving a defendant the procedural safeguards of a
jury trial, noting that "[i]f a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided
by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not
others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attached to the
offense are heightened." 99
Stevens also restated the importance of the Court's expression in Jones,
declaring that the majority now endorsed his previous interpretation of the rule
that "[ilt is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assess-
92 See State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), affd, 731 A.2d 485
(1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S.
466 (2000).
93 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474.
94 Id. at 469.
95 Id. at 476; see supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
96 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)).
97 Id. at 476 ("In his 1881 lecture on the criminal law, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., observed:
'The law threatens certain pains if you do certain things, intending thereby to give you a new
motive for not doing them. If you persist in doing them, it has to inflict the pains in order that its
threats may continue to be believed.' New Jersey threatened Apprendi with certain pains if he
unlawfully possessed a weapon and with additional pains if he selected his victims with a purpose
to intimidate them because of their race. As a matter of simple justice, it seems obvious that the
procedural safeguards designed to protect Apprendi from unwarranted pains should apply equally
to the two acts that New Jersey has singled out for punishment. Merely using the label 'sentence
enhancement' to describe the latter surely does not provide a principled basis for treating them
differently.").
98 See id. at 481-83.
99 Id. at 484 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)).
[Vol. 106
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol106/iss3/11
RING V. ARIZONA
ment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt."' ° The Court explained more generally that
the key question was "one not of form, but of effect - does the required finding
expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's
guilty verdict?"''° In Apprendi's case, the majority of the Court found this issue
clearly answered in the affirmative because the result of the sentencing scheme
of the New Jersey Supreme Court had the practical effect of allowing a judge to
transform a second-degree offense into a first-degree offense. 0 2 Therefore, the
Court reversed Apprendi's conviction and held that a defendant could not be
subject to a judicially imposed sentence penalty that is in excess of the statutory
maximum that could be imposed by the factual assessments of a jury. 03 Finally,
the Court attempted to distinguish Walton, albeit abstractly, on the grounds that
the judicial sentencing discretion in Walton was only applicable in capital pun-
ishment situations when the jury had previously found the defendant guilty of all
the elements of the death sentence; thus, the Court explained, this allowed the
judge to apply either the maximum or a more lenient sentence. 4
Justice O'Connor's dissent articulated that "[o]ur Court has long recog-
nized that not every fact that bears on a defendant's punishment need be charged
in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved by the government beyond a
reasonable doubt."'' 0 5 O'Connor criticized the majority for applying such a
broad holding with a vague and unsubstantiated historical foundation.'°6 In her
opinion, she found it "remarkable that the Court cannot identify a single in-
stance [in which] our Court has applied, as a constitutional requirement, the rule
it announces today."'0 7 O'Connor also focused on the fact that the majority es-
sentially overlooked the Court's prior decision in Patterson v. New York.' °8
Finally, O'Connor firmly rejected the majority's assessment that Walton was
inapplicable and questioned how the Court was able to find that the case did not
100 Id. at 490 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring)).
101 Id. at 494.
102 Id.
103 See id. at 483, 497.
104 Id. at 496-97.
105 Id. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's dissent was also joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer. Id. at 523.
106 Id. at 525 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 531-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977)). In Patterson, the Court rejected an expansive application of the Due Process Clause that
would have required proof of every fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at
215-16.
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apply without overruling Walton's holding.1l 9 She rationalized that "[i]f a State
can remove from the jury a factual determination between life and death [under
Walton] ... it is inconceivable why a State cannot do the same with respect to a
. . . 10 year increase in the maximum sentence to which a defendant is ex-
posed."
1 10
III. RING v. ARIZONA
A. Background
1. Arizona's Capital Punishment Sentencing Scheme
Under Arizona law at the time of Ring's sentencing, an individual con-
victed of murder in the first-degree as classified by Title Thirteen, Chapter
Eleven, Section Five of the Arizona Revised Statutes"' was subject to the terms
of the Arizona homicide sentencing scheme which allowed a punishment of
death or life imprisonment." 2 The sentencing scheme instructed that following
a finding of guilt on the part of the defendant, the judge shall conduct a "sepa-
rate sentencing hearing to determine the existence or non-existence of the [ag-
gravating and mitigating] circumstances in subsections F and G ... [and that]
[t]he court alone shall make all factual determinations required by this sec-
tion." 13 In balancing these circumstances, the court "shall impose a sentence of
109 See Apprendi, 430 U.S. at 536-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
l 0 Id. at 537 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
HI ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-1105 (1997) (current version as amended at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1105 (West Supp. 2003)).
112 Id. § 13-703(A) (current version as amended at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(A) (West
Supp. 2003)).
113 Id. § 13-703(B) (current version as amended at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(C)-(D)
(West Supp. 2003). The statute provided for the consideration of the subsequent ten aggravating
circumstances:
1. The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States
for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was im-
posable.
2. The defendant was previously convicted of a serious offense, whether
preparatory or completed.
3. In the commission of the offense[,] the defendant knowingly created a
grave risk of death to another person or persons in addition to the person mur-
dered during the commission of the offense.
4. The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or
promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value.
5. The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or
in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
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death if the court finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances . . and
that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for le-
niency."
1 14
2. Facts
On November 28, 1994, an armored van arrived for a collection outside
a department store at a local mall in Glendale, Arizona." 5 When the courier
6. The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner.
7. The defendant committed the offense while in the custody of or on au-
thorized or unauthorized release from the state department of corrections, a
law enforcement agency[,] or a county or city jail.
8. The defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides, as de-
fined in § 13-1101, which were committed during the commission of the of-
fense.
9. The defendant was an adult at the time the offense was committed or was
tried as an adult and the murdered person was under fifteen years of age or
was seventy years of age or older.
10. The murdered person was an on duty peace officer who was killed in the
course of performing his official duties and the defendant knew, or should
have known, that the murdered person was a peace officer.
Id. § 13-703(F) (current version as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (West Supp.
2003). These aggravating circumstances are essentially to be balanced in the sentencing hearing
against any mitigating circumstances, in the context that:
Mitigating circumstances shall be any factors proffered by the defendant or
the state which are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less
than death, including any aspect of the defendant's character, propensities or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense, including but not limited
to the following:
1. The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of [the] law was significantly
impaired, but no so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
2. The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, although not
such as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
3. The defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another under
the provisions of § 13-303, but his participation was relatively minor, al-
though not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
4. The defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct would
in the course of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was
convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to an-
other person.
5. The defendant's age.
Id. § 13-703(G) (current version as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §. 13-703(G) (West Supp.
2003)).
114 Id. § 13-703(E) (current version as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (West
Supp. 2003)).
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returned with the deposit, he discovered both the van and its driver were miss-
ing." 6 Subsequently, the van was located in a church parking lot; however, by
the time the van was located, the driver had been murdered and over $800,000
in cash and checks had been stolen.1 7 During the investigation, the local police
utilized a tip from an informant to establish probable cause in order to tap the
phones of suspects Timothy Ring, James Greenham, and William Ferguson."
8
Following some creative police work designed to elicit communication between
the suspects, Ring mentioned a "'very large bag"' in a phone conversation with
Ferguson.1 9 Consequently, a search of Ring's house revealed "a duffel bag in
his garage containing more than $271,000 in cash." 20  Accompanying the
money was a note, which seemed to signify how the money was to be split
among the suspects. 2 ' This note was later shown to have been written by
Ring. 122
3. Procedural History
a. Maricopa County Superior Court
At Ring's trial, complications did not allow the prosecution to prove
that the weapon found was the one used in the crime. 123 Therefore, the State
relied primarily on circumstantial evidence regarding the money to prove its
case. 24 In his defense, Ring argued that the money which had been seized was
earned through employment as a bail bondsman and as an FBI informant, and
was earmarked for starting a new corporation in the construction industry. 25
However, the State introduced subsequent testimony that Ring could not have
15 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002).
116 Id.
117 See id.
118 See id. at 589-90.
119 See id. at 590.
120 Id.
121 See State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1144 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc), rev'd, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1144 n.2. The search revealed a rifle that had been concealed in the garage, which
incidentally matched the description of the weapon Ring's co-defendant later admitted at the
sentencing hearing that Ring had used to murder the driver. Id. at 1144. However, the prosecu-
tion did not have sufficient evidence at Ring's trial to prove the gun caused the driver's death. See
id.
124 See id.
125 Id.
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made more than $9,000 in these employment positions.126 Although the jury
was divided on the issue of premeditated murder, 27 "[o]n December 6, 1996, a
jury found Defendant, Timothy Stuart Ring, guilty of first-degree [felony] mur-
der, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, burglary and theft."' 28
Following the verdict and prior to the sentencing hearing, Ring's accomplice
Greenham negotiated with the prosecution and agreed to a reduced sentence in
exchange for his testimony against Ring.129 At the sentencing hearing, Green-
ham testified that Ring had "'taken the role as leader"' and had not only killed
the driver of the van but also complained that his accomplices had not ap-
plauded him for his actions.
30
The trial judge used this testimony to find that the circumstances of the
case required that Ring receive the sentence of death for the murder of the ar-
mored van driver.' 3' In applying the Arizona capital punishment scheme, the
trial judge was required to balance a finding of aggravating circumstances with
offsetting mitigating circumstances. 32 The court's analysis revealed two poten-
tial aggravating circumstances: (1) "Ring committed the offense in expectation
of receiving something of 'pecuniary value"' and (2) "the offense was commit-
ted 'in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.""' 33 These factors
were considered to be present because the jury found that Ring had stolen the
money from the van, and Greenham testified that Ring seemed to gain a sense of
satisfaction from the killing.' 34 Conversely, the judge did recognize "Ring's
'minimal' criminal record" as a mitigating factor. 35 However, the trial judge
determined that this mitigating factor was not sufficient "'to call for leni-
ency.''136 As a result, the trial judge imposed the death sentence.137
126 See Ring v. Arizona 536 U.S. 584, 591 (2002).
127 Id.
128 Ring, 25 P.3d at 1142.
129 Ring, 536 U.S. at 593.
130 Id. at 593-94.
131 Id. at 594.
132 See supra note 112-14 and accompanying text.
133 Ring, 536 U.S. at 594-95 (citations omitted).
134 See id. at 595.
135 Id. (citation omitted).
136 Id. (citation omitted).
137 Id.
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b. Arizona Supreme Court - State v. Ring
Under the terms of Arizona law, Ring was automatically granted a di-
rect appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court. 38 Ring's primary argument focused
on the constitutionality of the Arizona scheme in light of the United States Su-
preme Court decisions in Jones and Apprendi.139 Considering the conflict be-
tween Walton and Apprendi, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed how the Ap-
prendi majority attempted to distinguish Walton. 4 The court found this analy-
sis unpersuasive and explained that it believed Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Apprendi more accurately reflected the Arizona sentencing proceeding.' 4' The
court noted that a defendant cannot receive the death sentence as a result of a
jury verdict alone. 42 The death penalty could only be applied through the use of
a sentencing hearing held by the judge, without a jury. 143 Even then, it could
only be imposed when an aggravating circumstance was found that essentially
outweighed any potential mitigating circumstance. 44 Thus, the court concluded
that neither Apprendi nor Jones had overruled the Arizona death penalty scheme
and rejected Ring's constitutional challenge. 45
Ring also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence the Superior Court
relied upon to find the aggravating factors. 46 In evaluating the first aggravating
circumstance, the court stated, "Although [Ring's] statements reflect a calcu-
lated plan to kill, satisfaction over the apparent success of his plan, and an ex-
treme callousness or lack of remorse after the murder, the evidence does not
support a finding" that Ring acted in a heinous or depraved manner or relished
the act of murder. 47 Despite this finding, the court reached a vastly different
138 State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1142 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc), rev'd, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (citing
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01 (2001)).
139 Id. at 1150. Ring also appealed the trial court's refusal to suppress the wiretap evidence, the
denial of his motion for a new trial, the denial of the introduction of evidence that a third-party
may have committed the crime, the trial judge's reliance on his accomplice's testimony as the sole
determination of the sentence, the factual basis behind the trial judge's application of the two
aggravating factors, and the trial judge's lack of sufficient weight to his mitigating circumstance
that he had no prior criminal history. See id. at 1145-55.
140 See id. at 1150-52.
141 See id. at 1151-52 ("Therefore, the present case is precisely as described in Justice O'Con-
nor's dissent - Defendant's death sentence required the judge's factual findings. Specifically, the
trial judge in this case made the necessary factual finding to support the aggravating circumstance
that the killing was heinous and depraved."); see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 596.
142 Ring, 25 P.3d at 1152.
143 See id. (emphasis added).
144 See id.
145 See id. at 1152.
146 See id. at 1153-54.
147 Id. at 1153.
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conclusion when assessing the aggravating factor of "pecuniary gain."'' 48 The
court approved the trial judge's conclusion that the driver of the armored van
was clearly murdered in order for Ring to obtain the large sum of money.14 9
Therefore, the court found that Ring's argument that the murder was a result of
the "common sin of greed" was without merit and upheld the death penalty. 150
B. United States Supreme Court Decision
Following the Arizona Supreme Court decision, Ring petitioned the
United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari151 to resolve the apparent
conflict lower courts had encountered in trying to reconcile Walton with Ap-
prendi 52 Due to the potential impact of the issues, the case was "'fast tracked'
with an expedited briefing and argument schedule" and came before the Su-
preme Court on April 22, 2002.' 5' At oral argument, 54 Ring was represented by
Andrew Hurwitz and the State of Arizona was represented by former State At-
torney General and current Governor Janet Napolitano. 5 5 During the course of
the oral argument, the Justices aggressively questioned both sides about the im-
pact that Apprendi would have in the event it was applied to capital punishment
schemes. 56 The primary inquiries directed to Mr. Hurwitz focused upon the
practical repercussions of striking down capital punishment schemes in a sig-
nificant number of states and the potential effect upon the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines. 57 Mr. Hurwitz replied, "The basic constitutional principle that un-
derlies the Sixth Amendment ... is the notion that ... before the State is al-
lowed to exact the maximum punishment ... a jury of your peers is allowed to
you to find those facts to put the State in that position."'' 58 On the other hand,
the Court's questioning for Ms. Napolitano focused primarily on the Sixth
148 Id. at 1154.
149 See id.
150 See id. at 1154, 1156.
151 Ring v. Arizona, 534 U.S. 1103 (2002).
152 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 596 (2002); see, e.g., United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d
150, 159-60 (4th. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
153 Joan Huls, Ring Cycle Continues: Arizona Capital Sentencing at U.S. Supreme Court, ARIZ.
ATrr'Y, July, 2002, at 24, 25 http://www.azbar.org/ArizonaAttomey/pdf-upload/AZAT0702
supremepg24-29.pdf.
154 For a review of the oral argument, see generally Oral Argument Transcript, Ring v. Ari-
zona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (No. 01-488), http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/
06may20020730/www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument transcripts/01 -488.pdf.
155 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 587; see also Huls, supra note 154, at 26.
156 See Huls, supra note 154, at 26.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 28.
2004]
19
Koudele: Unraveling Ring v. Arizona: Balancing Judicial Sentencing Enhance
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Amendment.1 59 Napolitano articulated that "[t]here are some facts that the legis-
lature is entitled to find which don't go to the definition of the crime but go to
the punishment. And this Court has never held there's a Sixth Amendment right
to jury [trial] sentencing."' 160 Approximately two months after oral arguments,
the Court issued its decision in Ring v. Arizona on June 24, 2002. 161
1. Justice Ginsburg's Majority Opinion
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority of the Court, explained that
the issue would focus upon "whether that aggravating factors may be found by
the judge, as Arizona law specifie[d] or whether the Sixth Amendment's jury
trial guarantee ... require[d] that the aggravating factor determination be en-
trusted to the jury."'162 In evaluating this issue, Justice Ginsburg thoroughly
discussed how the Court's approach has changed from Walton, to Jones, and
finally to Apprendi.163 By considering the context of Ring's claim, the Court
noted the significance that Ring could only have received a maximum sentence
of life in prison under the jury verdict itself as opposed to the death sentence he
received through judicial determination. 164
Turning to the specific conflicts from prior case law, the Court began its
analysis with brief summaries of Walton, Jones, and Apprendi.165 In evaluating
the latter two cases, the Court recognized how it had previously distinguished
Walton on inconsistent grounds. 166 On one hand, Jones only seemed to distin-
guish Walton on the ground that capital sentencing enhancements play a differ-
ent role in the criminal justice system. 167 On the other hand, Apprendi seemed
to explain Walton's acceptance of capital sentencing enhancements on the prem-
ise that since death was the maximum possible sentence for first-degree murder,
the jury's declaration of total guilt was sufficient to allow the judge to choose
the sentence.168 Although the Arizona Supreme Court rejected this distinction
by choosing to follow Justice O'Connor's dissent in Apprendi, the State at-
159 See id. at 26.
160 Id.
161 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
162 Id. at 597. The Court further noted that Ring's claim is specifically narrow, such that he
"only contends that the Sixth Amendment required jury findings on the aggravating circumstances
asserted against him." Id. at 597 n.4.
163 Id. at 598-603.
164 See id. at 597.
165 See id. at 598-603.
166 See id. at 600-03.
167 See id. at 600-01.
168 Id. at 602-03.
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tempted to utilize the distinction by arguing that "Ring was convicted of first-
degree murder, for which Arizona law specifies 'death or life imprisonment' as
the only sentencing options ... Ring was therefore sentenced within the range
of punishment authorized by the jury verdict."'' 69 The Court clearly rejected this
argument, stating that a death sentence could only be achieved after an aggravat-
ing circumstance was established in the post-verdict sentencing hearing thereby
subjecting Ring to an increased punishment.'70
In addition, the State claimed that, under Walton, the present case could
be protected as involving a sentencing "factor" rather than an element of an of-
fense. 171 The Court, yet again citing Apprendi, rationalized that this distinction
in language was no longer significant when the focus was the maximum pun-
ishment. 72 Finally, Arizona claimed that capital punishment, through the use of
judicial conclusion of aggravating circumstances, is distinct because limitations
are already provided through the Eighth Amendment, and judges are better
suited to ensure capital punishment is not capriciously applied. 73 The Court
clarified that this argument has no real merit because there is no precedent for
allowing more freedom in capital cases under the guise of the Eighth Amend-
ment. 74 Furthermore, the Court stated that the claim that a judge may be able to
more efficiently restrain capital punishment is not clearly accepted, 75 and that
the Sixth Amendment is not grounded in efficiency but rather the freedom of the
jury trial system. 176
As a result of its heavy reliance on Apprendi and the inability to ade-
quately balance Apprendi with Walton, the Court partially struck down Walton,
"to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury to find an
aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty."' 177
Therefore, the Court held that "[b]ecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating
factors operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense'.
. . the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury," and it conse-
quently reversed Ring's conviction.1
78
169 Id. at 603-04 (citation omitted).
170 See id. at 604-05.
171 See id. at 604.
172 See id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 492 (2000)).
173 See id. at 605-06.
174 Id. at 606 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 539 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
175 See id. at 607-08. The Court noted that twenty-nine of the thirty-eight states delegate the
sentencing decision for capital punishment to juries. Id. at 608 n.6.
176 See id. at 607.
177 Id. at 609.
178 Id. (citation omitted).
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2. The Concurring Opinions
a. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion '79 arguably plays a very significant
role because Scalia reconciles the two apparently conflicting Supreme Court
principles enunciated in Walton180 and Apprendi.'8' Scalia focused his analysis
on the constitutionality of the different principles under the Sixth Amend-
ment.' 82 Scalia first reiterated his more recent belief from Apprendi that "the
fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee. . . is that all facts essential to
imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives . . . must be
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt."' 183 Scalia then explained how, in
Walton, the appellant's argument seemed too broad considering the State's in-
herent ability to structure its capital punishment scheme.' 84 Even if Walton's
challenge had been narrower, Scalia stated that he would have upheld the Ari-
zona sentencing scheme over the Apprendi principle. 85
In reflecting upon these conflicting positions, Scalia noted that two sig-
nificant "realizations" had changed his viewpoint as to the application of the
Apprendi principle to "aggravating factors" in capital punishments schemes.
86
First, Scalia explained the difficulties of determining the impact of Furman v.
Georgia'87 upon "aggravating factors" added to capital punishment schemes
after Furman.'88 Subsequently, and more critically, he explained that recent
statutory trends have granted the power of sentence enhancements to judges
"beyond what is authorized by the jury's verdict" and that these enhancements
had essentially depreciated the fundamental right of trial by jury embodied in
the Sixth Amendment.189 In addition, Scalia stated his opinion that in criminal
cases such as Ring, the basic principles of common law require that any so-
179 ld. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
180 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 641 (1990), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002).
181 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 467 (2000).
182 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
183 Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
184 Id. at 611 (Scalia, J., concurring). Walton had argued that "every finding of fact underlying
the sentencing decision," including the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors, must be
found by the jury. Id. (citing Walton, 497 U.S. at 647).
185 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
186 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
187 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
188 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 611 (Scalia, J., concurring).
189 Id. at 611-12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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called "aggravating factors ... must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 9 In his conclusion, Scalia commented that the effect of the Court's
decision was not to eliminate schemes that leave the final "life or death deci-
sion" to the judge, but rather to compel state legislatures to modify such sen-
tencing schemes to require the jury to find the facts which support these "aggra-
vating factors" prior to the sentencing stage. 
191
b. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
In a brief yet clear concurrence, Justice Kennedy commented on his en-
during displeasure with the Court's decision in Apprendi. 92 As a member of the
majority in Walton,'93 Kennedy had strictly opposed the Apprendi Court's view
on sentencing enhancements as evidenced by his dissent in Jones'9 4 and his en-
dorsement of Justice O'Connor's dissent in Apprendi.195 Nevertheless, Kennedy
agreed that Apprendi was applicable law and that "no principled reading of Ap-
prendi would allow Walton... to stand."'' 96 Despite this acceptance, he noted
his view that Apprendi should not be extended to the point that it stifles the
states' ability to adequately address the problems imposed by the criminal jus-
tice system.197
c. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer wrote separately in Ring, despite the fact that he con-
curred in the majority's ultimate ruling, because he did not agree with Justice
Ginsberg's rationale. In Breyer's view, the Eighth Amendment requires capital
punishment sentencing to be performed by a jury instead of a judge. 98 Addi-
tionally, Breyer took the opportunity to examine the theoretical justifications
that support capital punishment. In this analysis, Breyer relied primarily on
sociological studies which showed: (1) no significant evidence of criminal de-
terrence in capital punishment jurisdictions; and (2) a decrease of further crimi-
190 Id. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
191 See id. at 611-12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
192 Id. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
193 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 642 (1990), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002).
194 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 254 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
195 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 523 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
196 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
198 Id. (Breyer J., concurring).
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nal activity for individuals that were sentenced to life without parole.199 Breyer
continued his criticism of capital punishment schemes that allow a judge to
make sentencing decisions by explaining that juries hold a "comparative advan-
tage" over judges since the people themselves are more likely to represent the
values of the community.2 ° Consequently, juries are better equipped to deter-
mine when capital punishment may be socially appropriate .20  Furthermore,
Breyer cited sociological and governmental reports finding that the "race of the
victim and socio-economic factors" have contributed to the imposition of the
death penalty in many states and other potential constitutional problems in the
process such as inadequate representation and unnecessary delays following the
202imposition of death sentences. Finally, Breyer commented on the contempo-
rary trend of modem nations to prohibit capital punishment and concluded that
these factors, in combination with the Eighth Amendment, dictate that a death
sentence should only imposed be by a jury.20 3
3. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor articulated her preference for the Court
to overrule Apprendi rather than Walton.2° O'Connor largely relied on her dis-
sent from Apprendi where she criticized the majority for unjustly seizing the
established system of sentencing power, which had traditionally been delegated
to judges.205 In addition, O'Connor reiterated her disagreement with the princi-
ple from Apprendi, which required bound elements of a crime and facts that
enhance a maximum sentence be viewed on the same constitutional level.2°
Furthermore, she commented on the practical problems created post-Apprendi,
specifically citing a distinct rise in criminal appeals, which have "caused an
enormous increase in the workload of an already overburdened judiciary. 2 7 In
conclusion, O'Connor articulated the most critical problem with the majority's
analysis - the practical implications associated with striking down capital pun-
199 Id. at 6 14-15 (Breyer, J., concurring).
200 See id. at 615-16 (Breyer, J. concurring) (citation omitted).
201 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 486-89 (1984) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
202 Ring, 536 U.S. at 617 (Breyer, J., concurring).
203 Id. at 618-19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
204 Id. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's dissent was joined only by Chief
Justice Rehnquist. Id.
205 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
206 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 620 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ishment in five states with little guidance as to the breadth of the decision or the
retroactive consequences to current death row inmates in those jurisdictions.2 8
IV. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF RING v. ARIZONA
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring clearly changed the
future landscape of capital punishment in our country. 2 9 The decision directly
voided capital punishment schemes in five states:210 Arizona, 211 Idaho, 212 Mon-
tana, 213 and Nebraska,214 which all divested the ultimate sentencing decision in
the sole discretion of a single judge, and Colorado,215 which delegated the sen-
tencing authority to a judicial panel.216 Therefore, as a result of the impact on
these five states alone, 168 prisoners on death row could potentially challenge
their sentences under Ring.2 17 Furthermore, the decision is thought to seriously
question the so-called "hybrid-system" process. This process, which allows a
judge to impose a sentence following a jury's recommendation,218 was utilized
in four states - Alabama, 21 9 Delaware, 220 Florida 22' and Indiana,222 - at the time
208 See id. at 620-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
209 For a recent in-depth discussion on the future of capital punishment, see generally Barbara
Bader Aldave, Foreword: The Future of Capital Punishment in the United States, 81 OR. L. REV.
1 (2002).
210 Ring, 536 U.S. 584, 620 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (recognizing this effect); see also id. at
608 n.6.
211 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001) (current version as amended at ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 2003)).
212 IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997) (current version as amended at IDAHO CODE § 19-
2515 (Michie Supp. 2003)).
213 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301(1), -305 (2002) (current version as amended at MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301(1), -305 (2003)).
214 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (2001) (current version as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
2520 (Supp. 2003)).
215 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001) (repealed) (recodified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (West Supp. 2003)) . For a thorough analysis of Colo-
rado's capital punishment scheme utilizing a judicial panel prior to Ring, see generally Robin
Lutz, Comment, Experimenting with Death: An Examination of Colorado's Use of the Three-
Judge Panel in Capital Sentencing, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 227 (2002).
216 See Associated Press, Court Overturns More than 150 Judge-Imposed Death Sentences,
June 24, 2002, at http://www.truthinjustice.org/ring.htm.
217 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 620-21 (2002) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 621 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
219 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994).
220 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2001) (current version as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4209 (Supp. 2002 & 2003)).
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of Ring. Finally, Ring also impacted schemes in Missour 22 and Nevada,224
which permitted judicial sentencing determinations in the event that the jury
could not reach a unanimous verdict. As a result, Ring undoubtedly affected
capital punishment systems in at least eleven, or almost thirty percent, of the
thirty-eight states that permit the death penalty.2 25 Such application could poten-
tially create new appeals for over five hundred more death row inmates in some
of those jurisdictions.22 6
Despite the apparent response that Ring signaled a victory for capital
punishment opponents, the brevity of the Court's analysis has clearly limited
and hampered the impact of the decision. As one commentator noted, the deci-
sion "answered one question and created half a dozen others, including how the
new rule affects defendants at various stages in the cases against them; whether
the decision requires actions in states where juries render advisory verdicts;
[and] what new laws are required to fix the problem the court identified. 227
As a result of the Court's failure to address these potential problems, the road to
assessing how Ring truly impacts capital punishment reform has yet to be de-
cided.
A. The Legislative Response - Emergency Statutory Reforms
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Ring, former Arizona Gov-
emor Jane Hull summoned the Arizona Legislature for a Fifth Special Session.
In this Special Session, the Arizona Legislature's Senate Judiciary Committee
took up three proposed bills addressing the state's newly unconstitutional capital
punishment scheme.12 8 The primary piece of reform legislation was Senate Bill1001,229 which retained the dual adjudication balancing process, yet included
221 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 2001).
222 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West 1998) (current version as amended at IND. CODE ANN. §
35-50-2-9 (West Supp. 2003)).
223 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4) (West 1999) (current version as amended at Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.030(4) (West Supp. 2004)).
224 NEV. REV. STAT. 175.554, .556 (2002) (current version as amended at NEV. REV. STAT.
175.554, .556 (LEXIS through 2003 legislation)).
225 See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 4, at 1.
226 Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Declares Death Penalty Sentencing in Five States Unconstitu-
tional, June 25, 2002, at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1024078893766.
227 Adam Liptak, A Supreme Court Ruling Roils Death Penalty Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2002, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=17&did=304; see also Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584, 619-21 (2002) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
228 Jury Sentencing: Hearing on S.B. 1001 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 45th Leg., 5th
Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2002) [hereinafter Judiciary Committee Hearing], available at
http:llwww.azleg.state.az.usllegtext/45leg/5slcomm-minlsenate/073 ljud.doc.htm.
229 S.B. 1001, 45th Leg., 5th Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2002), available at http://www.azleg.
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significant modifications that shifted capital punishment sentencing to the hands
of the jury.2 30  Specifically, the proposed legislation amended section 13-703
and added section 13-703.01 to delineate the new sentencing scheme. z3' Under
the terms of the new scheme, once the trier of fact has found the defendant
guilty of first-degree murder, a sentencing hearing must be held. 32 The first
step of the sentencing hearing is called the "aggravation phase. 2 33 Under this
step, "the trier of fact ... [shall] immediately determine whether one or more
alleged aggravating circumstances 234 have been proven., 235 The burden remains
on the prosecution to "prove the existence of the aggravating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt., 236 If the trier of fact is a jury then each aggravating
circumstance must be found unanimously in order to be proven. 37
Subsequently, if at least one aggravating circumstance has been found
by the trier of fact, the process advances to the "penalty phase" of the proceed-
ing where the trier of fact "determine[s] whether the death penalty shall be im-
posed., 238 At this stage, the trier of fact shall consider any evidence provided by
the prosecution or the defendant relating to mitigating circumstances. 239 The
burden of proof is on the defendant who must "prove the existence of the miti-
gating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. ' 24 It should be noted
that in the determination of this phase, the recognition of a mitigating circum-
stance is not subject to unanimous jury consent; rather, each juror can individu-
ally determine any potential claim and its weight.241 However, the new scheme
state.az.us/legtext/45leg/5s/bills/sb1001s.pdf. In addition, for a summary of the debate of the bill
as discussed, see generally Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 228.
230 See generally Ariz. S.B. 1001.
231 See generally id. § 3 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01 (West Supp. 2003)).
232 See id. (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01 (West Supp. 2003)).
233 id. (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(C) (West. Supp. 2003)).
234 For a list of the aggravating circumstances to be considered, see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-703(F) (West Supp. 2003).
235 Ariz. S.B. 1001, § 3 (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(C) (West Supp.
2003)). It is important to recognize that the statute defines "trier of fact" as "a jury unless the
defendant and the State waive a jury, in which case the trier of fact shall be the court." Id. (codi-
fied at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(R)(1) (West Supp. 2003)).
236 Id. § I (codified at ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (West Supp. 2003)).
237 Id. § 3 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(E) (West Supp. 2003)).
238 Id. (codified at ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(D) (West Supp. 2003)).
239 See id. § 3 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(G) (West Supp. 2003)). For a
list of the mitigating circumstances to be considered, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)
(West Supp. 2003).
240 Ariz. S.B. 1001, § I (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West Supp. 2003)).
241 See id.
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does require unanimous consent by the trier of fact that "death is the appropriate
sentence. ' '142 In the event a jury "unanimously determines that the death penalty
is not appropriate, the court shall determine whether to impose a sentence of life
or natural life.
' 243
Due to the tentative constitutionality of the proposed new scheme, Sen-
ate Bill 1001 also included provisions addressing judicial review,2" applicabil-
ity of the new and amended sections, 245 and a summary of the legislative intent
behind the law. 46 In regard to the judicial review provision, the proposed legis-
lation requires the Arizona Supreme Court to review all cases resulting in death
sentences for an abuse of discretion by the trier of fact.24 7 In the event that an
abuse of discretion is discovered, the court must analyze the magnitude of such
fault under a harmless error standard.248 This review provision, under the terms
of Senate Bill 1001, is to apply "to any sentencing or resentencing proceeding
on any first degree murder case that is held after the effective date of this act and
in which the offense was committed on or after the effective date of this act.,
249
In addition, the legislation specified that amended section 13-703 and its sup-
plement section 13-703.01 would only apply to first-degree murder sentencing
or resentencing hearings after the law goes into effect.250 Finally, the legislation
included the following statement of the Legislature's intent:
1. There be no hiatus in the imposition of the death penalty in
this state as a result of... Ring v. Arizona ....
2. Those persons ...previously sentenced to death in this
state not be entitled to a new sentencing proceeding pursuant to
this act if they have already exhausted direct appeals of their
sentences.
3. The adoption of the new capital jury sentencing procedures
...shall not be construed . . . [in a manner] that the former
242 Id. § 3 (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(H) (West Supp. 2003)).
243 Id. If at the penalty phase, the jury cannot reach a verdict, the court "shall impanel a new
jury [only for the penalty phase consideration and] ...[i]f the new jury is unable to reach a
unanimous verdict, the court shall impose a sentence of life or natural life on the defendant." Id.
(codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(K) (West Supp. 2003)).
244 Id. § 5 (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.05 (West Supp. 2003)).
245 Id. § 7.
246 Id. § 9.
247 Id. § 5 (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.05(A) (West Supp. 2003)).
248 Id. (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.05(B) (West Supp. 2003)).
249 Id. § 7(C).
250 Id. § 7(A).
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judge sentencing procedures are [labeled] unconstitutional or
that any death sentence imposed pursuant to the former proce-
dure is invalid.
4. Cases under supreme court review that are found to need
resentencing be remanded to the superior court for resentencing
B. It is not the intent of the Legislature to provide any right of
or basis for appeal or commutation that did not exist before the
effective date of this act.25" '
Prior to approval, Senate Bill 1001 was thoroughly discussed in the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Extensive testimony was provided, including that
of the State Attorney General (and current Governor) Janet Napolitano and sev-
eral other noted attorneys, professors, and advocates. Following a lengthy de-
bate, the Committee passed the legislation.252 As result of the Committee's ac-
tions, Senate Bill 1001 was sent to the entire legislature, which subsequently
approved the legislation, and was signed into law by former Governor Jane
Hull.253
1. A Potential Constitutional Flaw in Arizona's Revised Sentenc-
ing Scheme
Some commentators have suggested that Arizona's new legislation may
still be constitutionally defective. As discussed above, the new sentencing
scheme provides that "[a]t the penalty phase, . . . the defendant and the State
may present any evidence that is relevant to the determination of whether there
is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency .... [T]he State
may present any evidence that demonstrates that the defendant should not be
shown leniency. 2 54 Furthermore the law explains that "[t]he trier of fact shall
consider as mitigating circumstances any factors proffered by the defendant or
251 Id. § 9 (italics and emphasis added). The section of the bill cited supra notes 248-50 and
accompanying text seem to indicate that the Arizona Legislature did not intend the new scheme to
be applied retroactively.
252 See Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 228. The Committee also briefly addressed
the two other related pieces of proposed legislation. First, Senate Bill 1004, which proposed a
moratorium on the death penalty, was withheld by the bill sponsor likely due to the failure of a
similar amendment to Senate Bill 1001. Finally, the Committee addressed Senate Bill 1005,
which proposed the abolition of the death penalty in Arizona and obviously failed to obtain a
committee recommendation due to the passage of Senate Bill 1001. Id.
253 See generally Death Penalty Information Center, U.S. Supreme Court: Ring v. Arizona,
[hereinafter Ring Developments] at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=38&did=247.
254 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(G) (West Supp. 2003) (emphasis added); see also id. §
13-703(C).
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25the state that are relevant in determining" the sentence.  The primary problem
with such provisions, as expressed by current Governor and former Attorney
General Janet Napolitano, is that these sections permit the State to introduce
victim-impact statements reflecting the victims' sentencing preference. 56 Gov-
ernor Napolitano explained that this process is likely unconstitutional under
current doctrine from the United States Supreme Court.257 One can speculate
that Governor Napolitano was referring to the Court's decision in Booth v.
Maryland258 where the Court found that victim-impact statements including
"family members' opinions and characterizations of the crimes and the defen-
dant" were unconstitutional.25 9 However, three years later Booth was overruled
in part by Payne v. Tennessee.16 Payne held that "if the State chooses to permit
the admission of victim impact evidence ... the Eighth Amendment erects no
per se bar. ' 261 Despite this holding, the Court specifically noted that lack of
evidence prohibited it from addressing Booth's finding that family opinions
were unconstitutional.262 As a result, there is a significant argument that Booth
prohibits opinion evidence by a victim's family introduced under the revised
Arizona sentencing scheme.
2. The Effects of Ring in Other Jurisdictions
As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Ring potentially affects capital punishment schemes in as many as eleven
states. 63 Many of these states have already taken significant steps to remedy the
situation. In addition to Arizona, all four of the remaining states directly im-
pacted have taken legislative action. In Montana, the state legislature elected to
amend its statute to conform to Ring.264 Conversely, legislative reform in the
255 Id. § 13-703(G) (emphasis added).
256 See Ring Developments, supra note 253 (quoting Tucson Citizen Editorial, August 6, 2002).
For additional analysis on this problem, see generally Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implica-
tions of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282 (2003).
257 Ring Developments, supra note 253.
258 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled in part by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
259 See id. at 502, 508-09.
260 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
261 Id. at 827.
262 See id. at 830 n.2. For further analysis on the dichotomy between Booth and Payne, see also
Ellen Kreitzberg, Capital Cases, THE CHAMPION, Jan/Feb, 1998, http://www.criminaljustice.
org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/98jan04.htm.
263 See supra Part IV.
264 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-1-305 (2003). The legislature took action before the Montana
Supreme Court was able to address the issue. As of April 19, 2004, a LEXIS search of Ring v.
Arizona in the Montana Supreme Court yielded no citations.
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three other states directly affected by Ring was prompted by judicial challenges
to state sentencing schemes. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the death sen-
tence of an inmate under the principles of Ring.265 Subsequently, the Idaho Leg-
islature amended the capital punishment statute to comply with the decision.266
State supreme court decisions and statutory reforms have also occurred in Ne-
braska267 and Colorado.268
Whereas reform in those states directly impacted has been quickly im-
plemented, the "hybrid system" jurisdictions have been in less agreement. On
one hand, prior to Ring, both Indiana and Delaware employed similar sentencing
systems generally marked by three characteristics: (1) a sentencing hearing was
held before a jury which rendered an advisory verdict; (2) in order to impose a
death sentence, at least one aggravating factor was required to be found; and (3)
the judge could override the jury's verdict.269 In 2002, Indiana elected to amend
this process by eliminating the judicial override and explicitly requiring a jury to
make the aggravating circumstances determination.270 In Delaware, the re-
sponse was more moderately tempered as the legislature only amended the stat-
ute by adding the requirement that a unanimous jury find at least one aggravat-
ing circumstance as a pre-condition to the judicial imposition of the death sen-
tence.27' Conversely, there has been resistance in other "hybrid" states such as
Alabama and Florida. These two states also utilize a similar advisory verdict
process requiring the jury to find at least one aggravating factor to recommend a
death sentence but allowing the trial judge to override the jury's decision.272
Despite the similarities of the systems, both the Alabama Supreme Court and the
Florida Supreme Court have expressly refused to read Ring as striking down
273their sentencing processes.
265 See State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d 874 (Idaho 2002).
266 IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie Supp. 2003).
267 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2519, 29-2520 (Supp. 2003). The pre-Ring Nebraska scheme was
found to be unconstitutional in State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2003).
268 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (West 2003). The pre-Ring Colorado scheme,
which employed the judicial-panel sentencing format, was found to be unconstitutional in Woldt v.
People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003).
269 Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West 2001) (current version as amended at IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West Supp. 2003)), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4209 (2001) (current
version as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1I, § 4209 (Supp. 2002 & 2003).
270 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West Supp. 2003).
271 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1) (Supp. 2003). Delaware maintained the judicial over-
ride provision, provided the jury found at least one aggravating circumstance. Id. § 4209 (2001 &
Supp. 2002).
272 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (1994); id. § 13A-5-47(e); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141
(West 2001).
273 See Ex Parte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1181, 1190 (Ala. 2002); Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d
693 (Fla. 2002) (relying largely on prior approval of the Florida system by the United States Su-
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Finally, there have also been developments in Nevada and Missouri, the
two states that permitted judicial sentencing when the jury was deadlocked.
Under the original terms of the Nevada statute, if the jury was unable to reach a
unanimous sentencing decision, the Nevada Supreme Court appointed a three-
274judge panel to determine the sentence. However, in 2002, the Nevada Su-
preme Court ruled that this process was unconstitutional in light of Ring and that
a jury was required to make both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
determinations.275 The Nevada Legislature responded in 2003 by requiring, in
the case of a deadlocked jury, that the trial judge either impanel a new jury or
impose a sentence of life without parole.276 Additionally, almost one year ago,
the Missouri Supreme Court broadly held that Ring rendered the Missouri judi-
cial capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional. 77 Moreover, the Missouri court
ruled that Ring should apply retroactively and that prisoners sentenced under the
statute should be resentenced to life without parole.278 When considering all of
these changes in context, Ring has already mandated reforms in nine of the
eleven states thought to be affected by the decision.
B. The Retroactivity Problem
Despite these significant post-Ring reforms, the practical problem of ret-
roactivity - how the case affects those already on death row - remains. This
issue is even more challenging because Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion
failed to address the retroactivity issue at all. 279 Fortunately for those defendants
that have not exhausted all their appeals, retroactive application of Ring seems
clearly available under common-law precedent.28 ° Conversely, those potential
petitioners that have previously exhausted all appeals are left with the difficult
task of federal habeas corpus relief.28' Therefore, under current Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the potential petitioners are essentially required to overcome the
preme Court and citing, e.g., Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989)); Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447 (1984)); see also Randolph Pendleton, Florida Supreme Court Upholds Death Penalty
Law, Oct. 24, 2002, at http://www.fadp.org/news/oct24.html.
274 NEV. REV. STAT. 175.556 (2002) (current version as amended at NEV. REV. STAT. 175.556
(LEXIS through 2003 legislation)).
275 See Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450 (Nev. 2002).
276 NEV. REV. STAT. 175.556 (LEXIS through 2003 legislation).
277 See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003). The former Missouri statute allowed a
judge to sentence a defendant in the event that the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict. Id. at
256.
278 See id. at 264-72.
279 See generally Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
280 See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).
281 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
[Vol. 106
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol106/iss3/11
RING V. ARIZONA
presumption against retroactivity by showing that: (1) Ring created a new,
clearly established substantive rule; or (2) Ring established a new procedural
rule that meets one of the two exceptions permitting retroactive application.282
The first procedural exception for a new rule under Teague provides that "a new
rule should be applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe[.]' ' 283 The second exception applies if the new rule "'presents a wa-
tershed rule of criminal procedure"' that enhances accuracy and alters our un-
derstanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a particu-
lar conviction." 2 4 To make matters worse for potential petitioners, the distinc-
tions between what "rules" qualify as substantive, procedural, or procedural
retroactive exceptions are widely variant depending on the jurisdiction.285
As a result, there has been widely differing interpretations of Ring's
retroactivity. In Arizona, the Arizona Supreme Court held that while Ring did
create a new rule, it was procedural and not substantive.286 The court also found
that Ring did not meet either of the Teague procedural exceptions. 287 The Elev-
enth Circuit agreed with the Arizona Supreme Court's analysis and found that
Ring did not apply retroactively, stating:
Ring's new rule, at most, would shift the fact-finding duties
during ... [the] penalty phase from (a) an impartial judge after
an advisory verdict by a jury to (b) an impartial jury alone.
Ring is based on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and
not on a perceived, much less documented, need to enhance ac-
curacy or fairness of the fact-finding in a capital sentencing
context. Ring simply does not fall within the ambit of the sec-
288
ond Teague exception.
282 See generally Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality); Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614 (1998).
283 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
284 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1099 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, in part, sub
nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
285 Compare State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 44 (2003), with State
v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003), cert. denied sub nom., Whitfield v. Roper, 124 S. Ct.
1430 (2004), and Summerlin, 341 F.3d 1082.
286 See Towery, 64 P.3d at 832-33.
287 See id. at 833-35.
288 Turner v. Crosby, 339 F. 3d. 1247, 1286 (11 th Cir. 2003). A separate issue is whether Ring
applies to habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the Antiterroism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1986 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). Under the Act, a prisoner may petition
for a writ of habeas corpus by claiming "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sen-
tence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise sub-
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Conversely, the Ninth Circuit held that Ring applied retroactively under two
separate theories.289 First, the court found that Ring was exempt from Teague
because the rule actually did qualify as substantive;29° alternatively, Ring quali-
fied for the second Teague exception as a "watershed procedural" rule.291 Due
to the United States Supreme Court's grant of certiorari to hear the retroactivity
issue from this case,292 a more specific analysis of Summerlin should be pro-
vided.
1. Summerlin v. Stewart
In this case,293 Warren Summerlin was arrested for the murder of
Brenda Bailey.294 After Bailey did not return to work the following day, her
boyfriend became worried and retraced her whereabouts only to discover that
she did not arrive at her appointment following her visit to Summerlin's
ject to collateral attack." Id. However, successive petitions are prohibited unless the prisoner can
show "that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on col-
lateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i).
The statute also allows successive petitions if the prisoner forwards new evidence that "could not
have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence." Id. The Supreme Court
has interpreted the Act to prohibit successive petitions based on new constitutional rules unless the
Supreme Court itself "has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review." Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662 (2001). Thus, the Act changed common-law retroac-
tivity principles to limit habeas petitions. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255, § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)
(2000). The Court can either expressly or impliedly find the new rule retroactively applicable.
See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 668-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Habeas petitions filed before the enactment of the AEDPA are governed by pre-AEDPA
common-law retroactivity principles. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). Courts
that have examined whether Ring applies retroactively to habeas petitions filed after the enactment
date of the AEDPA law have found that Ring is not retroactive because the Ring Court did not
expressly state that the new rule was retroactive to cases on collateral review. See Moore v.
Kinney, 320 F.3d 767, 771 n. 3 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 123 S. Ct. 2580 (2003) (citing Tyler v.
Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001)); see also Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Cannon v. Oklahoma, 536 U.S. 974 (2002). However, as Justice O'Connor states
in Tyler, the Court can "logically dictate" the retroactivity of the new rule. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at
668-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Tenth Circuit rejected a claim that the Supreme Court had
made Ring impliedly retroactive through a combination of Teague, Ring, and the Apprendi line of
cases. See Cannon, 297 F.3d at 992-94. It remains to be seen if the Supreme Court has, or will,
make Ring retroactive to habeas petitions filed after the enactment of the AEDPA.
289 See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1099 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, in part,
sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
290 See generally id. at 1108.
291 See generally id. at 1120-21.
292 Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 833.
293 See infra notes 302, 306.
294 Sunmerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084-85. Bailey was a delinquent account manager that went to
Summerlin's home in reference to a debt. See id. at 1084.
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house.295 Subsequently, the police received a tip from Summerlin's mother-in-
law that Bailey had been murdered by Summerlin.296 Upon investigation, the
police located Bailey's deceased body in the trunk of her car only blocks from
Summerlin's house.297 As a result, the police executed a search warrant upon
Summerlin's home, which revealed significant evidence linking Summerlin to
the crime. 298 "After the search warrant was read to Summerlin, he stated, 'I
didn't kill nobody.' When the detective did not respond, Summerlin asked: 'Is
this in reference to the girl that was at my house? ' ' 299 The detective asked a
follow-up question, and Summerlin proceeded to describe Bailey.3°° At this
point, Summerlin was arrested for murder and appointed a public defender. 30'
Following extensive psychological examinations of Summerlin's mental
fitness, the court concluded he had a mental impairment but was competent to
stand trial.3 °2 Later at trial, Summerlin's new counsel focused his defense al-
most entirely on a lack of premeditation yet presented no evidence and only
called one witness. 30 3 The jury found Summerlin guilty of both first-degree
murder and sexual assault.3  Prior to the sentencing hearing, Summerlin's
counsel did not meet with Summerlin, failed to interview witnesses, and failed
295 Id.
296 See id. at 1084-85.
297 Id. at 1085.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id. There were also extensive procedural and substantive issues created involving an Alford
plea procured by Summerlin's court appointed counsel and, subsequently, a conflict of interest
which occurred between Summerlin's attorney and the prosecutor. See id. at 1086-88. As for the
proposed Alford plea agreement, Summerlin would have agreed to plead guilty, without admitting
guilt, to second-murder and aggravated assault and, additionally, admit a probation violation. In
exchange, Summerlin would only be required to serve fourteen years for the murder charge and a
maximum of fifteen years for the assault. Id. at 1086. The court subsequently rejected these
stipulated sentences and, under the terms of the agreement, Summerlin elected to withdraw and
proceed to trial. See id. at 1086-87. This decision to withdraw the plea made Summerlin eligible
for a first degree murder conviction and a death sentence. Id. at 1087. As for the conflict of inter-
est during her representation of Summerlin, Summerlin's attorney and the prosecutor handling the
case were involved in an intimate encounter over Christmas. Id. at 1086-87. Despite this encoun-
ter, Summerlin's attorney continued to represent him at the plea agreement hearing, and it was not
until six days later that this conflict resulted in the disqualification of the entire public defender's
office. Id. at 1087-88. As a result of these issues, the case was essentially reallocated on all lev-
els: a private practitioner was appointed to represent Summerlin and the Arizona Attorney Gen-
eral's Office took over the prosecution. Id. at 1088.
303 Id. at 1088.
304 Id.
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to present any significant factual mitigating evidence to the judge.3 °5 After a
brief sentencing hearing, Judge Marquardt 306 ruled that Summerlin was to be
sentenced to death as a result of two aggravating factors: (1) a prior felony con-
viction involving threatened violence; and (2) the fact that the offense was
committed "in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.
' 307
The Arizona Supreme Court, in State v. Summerlin,30 8 affirmed the con-
victions and corresponding death sentence.309  After four post-conviction at-
tempts for appeal in state court were denied and an initial petition for habeas
corpus relief in federal district court was also denied, Summerlin filed an
amended petition for habeas corpus in 1995.310 Although this petition was de-
nied in 1997, Summerlin was permitted to appeal under a certificate of appeal-
ability under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b)(1). 31  At this point, a
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to
determine whether the trial judge was competent to make the death penalty de-
termination.31 2 This decision was later vacated to await the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Ring.3 13 Following the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Ring, Summerlin requested that the Arizona Supreme Court recon-
sider his direct appeal as a result of the Ring decision. Although a stay was
granted, the Arizona Supreme Court refused to recall its decision denying Sum-
merlin's state court appeal.314 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear
the case en banc.31 5 In his appeal, Summerlin raised multiple issues regarding
effective assistance of counsel, conflict of interest, due process, and the constitu-
tionality of the Arizona death penalty statute as applied to him.
316
At the outset, the Ninth Circuit noted, "The [United States] Supreme
Court did not decide whether the holding in Ring applied to petitioners, such as
305 Id. at 1088-89.
306 The factual and legal issues in this case are further complicated by the fact that Judge Mar-
quardt, unknown to Summerlin, was later discovered to have been a frequent marijuana user. This
fact was conceded by the State at the District Court habeas proceeding. Id. at 1089.
307 Id. at 1090. In addition, the judge found that there were no mitigating circumstances. Id.
308 675 P.2d 686 (Ariz. 1983).
309 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id. (citing Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926, 957 (9th Cir. 2001)).
313 Id. (citing Summerlin v. Stewart, 281 F.3d 836, 837 (9th Cir. 2002)).
314 Id. at 1091. This decision exhausted Ring's state court remedies. Id.
315 See Summerlin v. Stewart, 310 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2002).
316 See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1092. For purposes of this Comment, the focus is concentrated
upon only the constitutionality of the Arizona death penalty claim and the retroactivity element
thereby discussed.
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Summerlin, who raised the constitutional challenge in collateral post-conviction
proceedings rather than on direct appeal. 317 Therefore, the court specifically
delineated the issue as "whether others who received the same constitutionally
infirm sentence, including those who previously raised the identical issue, are
eligible for the same relief or whether they should remain subject to execu-
tion. 31 8 Following a historical analysis of the role of retroactivity in the crimi-
nal procedure context,3t 9 the court focused on the application of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane.320 The threshold issue in
Teague focuses on whether the petitioner is attempting to apply a substantive
rule or procedural rule because Teague only serves as a retroactive bar to proce-
dural claims.32'
Although the Ninth Circuit did recognize Ring's procedural nature,322
the court explained that Ring's effect was more substantively broad.323 The
court articulated:
More than a procedural holding, Ring effected a redefinition of
Arizona capital murder law, restoring, as a matter of substantive
law, an earlier Arizona legal paradigm in which murder and
capital murder are separate substantive offenses with different
essential elements and different forms of potential punishment.
That is, as applied ...Ring's holding was "substantive" for
Teague purposes.324
In explaining the substantive aspect, the court evaluated the historical develop-
ment of Arizona's capital punishment jurisprudence noting that, in essence, by
overruling Walton, Ring restored the state of Arizona law to the pre-Walton
stage by redefining the crime of capital murder as a separate offense.3 25 The
317 Id. at 1096.
318 Id. at 1097.
319 See id. at 1096-99.
320 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Teague bars retroactive application of new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure unless they meet one of two exceptions. Id. at 310. For a discussion of how
Ring's retroactivity is analyzed under Teague, see infra notes 350-353, 363-75 and accompanying
text.
321 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1099. Summerlin's analysis of the Teague exceptions are discussed
infra notes 327-37 and accompanying text.
322 Id. at 1101 (explaining the procedural aspect is Ring's requirement that a jury find aggravat-
ing circumstances).
323 Id. at 1101-02.
324 Id. at 1102.
325 See id. at 1104-06.
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court noted that "Ring announced a 'substantive' rule ...for it 'altered the
meaning of [Arizona's] substantive criminal law."' 326
Notwithstanding its position on the substantive effect of Ring to Arizona
law, the court then analyzed the application of the Teague procedural excep-
tions.327 The second exception exempts a new procedural rule from the Teague
presumption against retroactivity if the new rule: "(1) seriously enhance[s] the
accuracy of the proceeding and (2) alter[s] our understanding of bedrock proce-
dural elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding." 328 Focusing upon
the accuracy enhancement factor, the court criticized the practical problems of
the pre-Ring penalty phase for three reasons. 329 First, the proceeding was regu-
larly condensed with limited evidentiary analysis.33 ° Second, judges making
capital sentence determinations were allowed to receive inadmissible evidence,
such as letters from the victim's family. 33 1 Finally, the court found that the ac-
curacy of the sentencing proceeding could only be enhanced by vesting the de-
terminative role in sentencing in the jury as society's moral representative of the
people.332 Thus, according to the court, applying Ring retroactively would en-
hance the accuracy of the sentencing proceeding.333
Turning to the second element of the Teague exception, the court recog-
nized that Ring clearly established a "bedrock procedural element" by establish-
ing that "under the Sixth Amendment, a jury verdict is required on the finding of
aggravated circumstances necessary to the imposition of the death penalty.
334
In analyzing the fairness of the proceeding, the court rejected the applicability of
harmless-error analysis because the wrong entity found Summerlin guilty of a
capital crime. 335 "This type of error cannot be cured . . . because, as Justice
Scalia observed: 'The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate specula-
tion about a hypothetical jury's action... ; it requires an actual jury finding of
326 Id. at 1106 (quotations and citations omitted). It is important to note that the Arizona Su-
preme Court has recently found that Ring was not substantive in nature and therefore denied retro-
active application under Teague. See State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828 (Ariz.), cert. dismissed, 124 S.
Ct. 44 (2003) (emphasis added).
327 See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1108-09. It should be noted that the court did recognize that the
first Teague exception did not apply to Ring. Id. at 1109.
328 Id. at 1109 (citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)).
329 See id. at I 110-15.
330 See id. at 1110.
331 Id. at 1 111-12.
332 See id. at 1113-15.
333 See id. at 1115.
334 Id. at 1 116 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002)).
335 Id. at 1 i117.
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guilty.' ' 336 As a result, the court found that this case involved an ultimate deci-
sion, which was inappropriately rendered by a judge, and that the decision suf-
fered from a "'plain defect."' 337  Consequently, the decision had to be va-
cated.338 Because the court found Ring to be substantive in nature or, at the very
least, within the second Teague procedural exception, the court held that "the
Supreme Court's decision in Ring ha[d] retroactive application to cases on fed-
eral habeas review. 339
The direct immediate effect of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Summer-
lin seems to commute the death sentences of over one hundred condemned in-
mates in Arizona, Idaho, and Montana.340 Although Colorado and Nebraska had
similar sentencing systems, they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Ninth
Circuit and are thereby unaffected by the decision. 341 Recently, in December,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the Ring retroactivity
issues raised in Summerlin.342 More specifically, the Court will hear the follow-
ing two issues:
1. Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule an-
nounced in Ring is substantive, rather than procedural, and
therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion)?
2. Did the Ninth Circuit err by alternatively holding that the
new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to cases on
collateral review under Teague's exception for watershed rules
of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles
and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings?343
336 Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993)) (emphasis added).
337 See id. at 1117-18 (citation omitted).
338 Id.
339 Id. at 1121. Summerlin was an 8-3 decision of the court. Circuit Judge Thomas authored
the majority opinion for the court, while Circuit Judge Reinhardt authored a concurring opinion.
Circuit Judge Rawilinson, joined by Circuit Judges O'Scannlain and Tallman, authored a dissent.
340 Associated Press, Scores of Death Sentences Tossed, Sept. 3, 2003, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/02/national/main571247.shtml.
341 Id.
342 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
343 Brief for Petitioner at i, Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
granted, in part, sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003), available at LEXIS, 2003
U.S. BRIEFS 526 (italics added).
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The Court heard oral arguments in this case, renamed Schriro v. Summerlin, on
April 19, 2004.3 " One legal commentator has asserted his belief that "[t]he
Justices were fairly clear [in Ring] in deciding that juries and not judges ought to
have the power to make life or death decisions in criminal cases, and for that
rule to make a lot of sense it almost has to apply retroactively." 345 The retroac-
tivity issue will be put to rest very soon.
2. Ring Should Be Applied Retroactively
When oral arguments are complete, the Supreme Court should find
that Ring applies retroactively on collateral review. Whether a rule will ap-
ply retroactively is a relatively new inquiry. 346 The common law presumes
retroactivity for constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court.347 Only after
the "criminal procedure revolution" of the 1960s did the Court adopt doc-
trines limiting the common-law presumption of retroactivity.348 After a se-
ries of cases that attempted to determine the proper retroactivity doctrine, the
Court adopted two theories on retroactivity depending on the nature of the
rule enunciated. Intervening changes in substantive law are applied retroac-
tively on collateral review.34 9 Procedural rules are governed by completely
different principles.
Current Supreme Court doctrine states that "new constitutional rules
of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have be-
come final before the new rules are announced., 35 0 There are two recog-
nized exceptions to the bar on retroactive application of new constitutional
rules of criminal procedure. A new rule should be retroactively applied if
the rule: (1) "place[s] certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe" 35' or
(2) "require[s] the observance of those procedures that.., are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." 35 2 The second exception has been limited to
those rules that present "a new 'watershed rule of criminal procedure' that
344 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ARGUMENT CALENDAR, I
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/02mar2004l745/www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-argume
nts/argument calendars/monthlyargumentcalapril2004.pdf
345 Associated Press, supra note 340 (quote by CBSNews.com Legal Analyst Andrew Cohen).
346 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1097.
347 Id. (citing Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94 (1993)).
348 See Ethan Issac Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive?, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1805, 1818 (2003).
349 See Bousley v. United States, 513 U.S. 614 (1998); Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333,
346-47 (1974).
350 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
351 Id. at 311. This exception to the Teague rule is rarely employed.
352 Id.
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enhances the accuracy and alters our understanding of bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of a particular conviction.
'
"
353
Applying these doctrines, the Court should apply Ring retroactively
using one of two separate retroactivity theories. First, there is a compelling
argument that Ring announced a substantive rule.354 Although the distinction
between procedural and substantive rules is sometimes hard to define, 355 a
substantive rule change is one that alters the scope or modifies the applica-
bility of a substantive criminal statute. 356 The rule in Ring should meet this
standard; 357 thus, the rule should be retroactively applied on collateral review
under the rule enunciated in Davis v. United States.
358
Ring is similar to other cases that have received retroactive applica-
tion.359 Similarly, the rule announced in Ring effectuated a "wholesale in-
validation of Arizona's capital sentencing scheme.,, 360 By requiring a jury to
determine sentencing enhancements in capital cases, Ring returned Arizona
law to its pre-Furman status.36' Most importantly, in invalidating the Ari-
zona statute, the Court decided the meaning of a criminal statute in a manner
that separated the offense of murder from capital murder.362
The second theory that would allow the Court to apply Ring retroac-
353 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1099 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, in part, sub
nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
354 See id. at 1099-1108; see also Jacobs, supra note 348, at 1818.
355 See United States v. Woods, 986 F.2d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1993).
356 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1100.
357 See id. at 1105-08; see also Jacobs, supra note 348, at 1835-37.
358 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
359 See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 815 (1999) (finding that a new rule requir-
ing jury unanimity on individual violations alleged as part of a criminal enterprise is a substantive
change).
360 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1102.
361 Id. The Summerlin court placed great emphasis on the effect Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972), had on Arizona law. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1102. Furman held that death penalty
statutes that vest complete sentencing discretion to judges were unconstitutional. Furman, 408
U.S. at 256-57. Subsequently, the Supreme Court applied Furman retroactively. Summerlin, 341
F.3d at 1102 (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S.
537 (1982)). Since Ring effectuated a change to the elements of the Arizona death penalty statute
akin to Furman, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Ring decision was also a substantive change.
Id. at 1119-20 ('The Supreme Court's decision in Ring affects the structure of every capital trial
and has rendered unconstitutional every substantive statute in conflict with its dictates. It involves
the structure of penalty-phase trials which, unlike non-capital sentencing proceedings, are subject
to the constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Thus, Ring's effect on capital murder cases is
akin to that of Furman, which declared that death penalty statutes vesting complete discretion in
the judge or in the jury, like Arizona's, were unconstitutional. Furman, as already noted, was
given full retroactive effect for the purposes of federal habeas review.") (citations omitted).
362 Id. at 1108.
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tively is under one of the Teague exceptions. If the Court fails to find that
Ring is a substantive rule, the Court should find that Ring is a "'watershed
rule of criminal procedure' that enhances the accuracy and alters our under-
standing of bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a par-
ticular conviction. '" 363 If the Court finds that a rule is procedural, the Court
undertakes a three-step analysis to determine if Teague bars the rule's appli-
cation.3 64 The first step is to determine the date the defendant's conviction
became final for Teague purposes. 365 The second step requires the Court to
survey "the legal landscape as it then existed to determine whether existing
precedent compelled a finding that the rule at issue was required by the Con-
stitution. 366  If existing precedent requires application of the rule, the
Teague bar does not apply. 367 "If, by contrast, the procedure at issue is con-
sidered a new rule for Teague purposes, the court must proceed to the third
step and determine whether either of the two announced exceptions ap-
plies. 368 Because Ring can be shown to seriously enhance the accuracy of
the sentencing proceeding and because it alters our understanding of bedrock
procedural elements affecting the basic fairness of the proceeding, the Court
should rule that Ring is a watershed rule of criminal procedure and apply the
rule retroactively.369
The Eleventh Circuit declined to apply Ring retroactively because
"Ring, like Apprendi, 'is not sufficiently fundamental to fall within Teague's
second exception. ' , 370 The court barely addressed whether Ring would en-
hance the accuracy of the proceeding; rather, the court relied on two princi-
ples to find that Ring should not be applied retroactively. First, the court
cited Supreme Court precedent that stated that the second Teague exception
should be narrowly applied. Second, the court found that "Ring's new rule,
at most, would shift the fact-finding duties during . . . [the] penalty phase
from (a) an impartial judge after an advisory verdict by a jury to (b) an im-
partial jury alone."371
The Court should reject Turner's reasoning as flawed and adopt the
reasoning employed by the Ninth Circuit in Summerlin v. Stewart.3 72 First,
363 Id. at 1099 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989)).
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 For a full Teague analysis that the Court should adopt, see id. at 1109-21.
370 Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1285 (11 th Cir. 2003).
371 See id. at 1286.
372 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1082. In Summerlin, the Ninth Circuit found that Ring was a water-
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the Turner analysis is conclusory. Contrary to Turner's assertions, 373 the
accuracy of the penalty phase of the preceding would be increased because
inadmissible evidence would be restricted and the moral guilt of the defen-
dant would be assessed by the jury instead of a judge. 374 Similarly, Ring
affects the basic fairness of the proceeding because the case corrects a trial
that "proceeded under a completely incorrect, and constitutionally deficient,
frame-work.,
375
In sum, there are adequate avenues to allow the Court to apply Ring
retroactively; in addition, the law supports a ruling that applies Ring in this
manner. The Court has already found that the Sixth Amendment requires a
jury to make factual determinations "on which the legislature conditions an
increase in their maximum punishment. 376 By finding that "Arizona's enu-
merated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional equivalent of an ele-
ment of a greater offense,"' the Court expressed a fairly clear principle that
juries should make life and death determinations. It makes sense to apply
these same Sixth Amendment principles to those unfortunate prisoners who
happened to exhaust their appeals before the Ring decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The difficulty with capital punishment is that, by its nature, it is one of
the few issues that is inherently burdened by an individual's sense of morality.
The effect of this moral burden is that the death penalty issue tends to create a
lack of objectivity and increased polarization of opinions. As best-selling author
Scott Turow has commented, "For most Americans, the death penalty debate
goes no further than asking whether they 'believe' in capital punishment ...
The death penalty ... maintains its hold on the American conscience because of
its intensely symbolic nature. Values count enormously in our lives. 377 This
"belief' pervades the unique complexity of how the death penalty is treated such
that even former United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart explained,
"[D]eath is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than
shed rule of criminal procedure. See id. at 1121.
373 See Turner, 339 F.3d at 1286.
374 See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1113-15. The Ninth Circuit stated that the jury would act as a
better judge of moral guilt than a judge. See id. at 1113-14. One of the reasons supporting this
statement is that jury members would probably only sit on one death penalty case. Id. at 1114.
Thus, representatives of the community would better reflect societal values. See id. at 1113-14.
Conversely, judges are subjected to countless capital cases that may cause the judge to be accli-
mated to matters of a heinous nature. See id. at 1114.
375 Id. at 1116.
376 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002).
377 Scoi-r TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER'S REFLECTIONS ON DEALING WITH THE
DEATH PENALTY 23, 64 (2003).
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degree." 378 As a result of these variant social norms and changes in the Court's
composition and views, the death penalty has understandably had a turbulent
jurisprudential history in this country.
Nevertheless, in 2002, the landscape of capital punishment significantly
changed with the Court's decisions in Atkins v. Virginia379 and Ring v. Ari-
zona.380 By holding that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury, rather than a
judge, to make the factual decision upon required aggravating factors as a pre-
requisite to applying the death penalty, the Court has thrust capital punishment
reform upon the states.381 Even aside from the nine states previously mentioned
that have taken some action to conform to Ring, the case has also prompted an
increased critique by several states regarding the effectiveness of capital pun-
ishment. The most notable of these critical assessments came in January of
2003 when a previously "lifelong supporter of the death penalty," former Illinois
Governor Republican George Ryan, found the Illinois system to be "'fraught
with error"' and decided to pardon four inmates and commute the remaining 167
death sentences in Illinois. 82 In addition to Illinois, subsequent moratorium
considerations have arisen in other prominent states such as Pennsylvania and
Maryland.383 As a clear result, capital punishment reform is unmistakably at the
current forefront of our culture. Although the brevity of the Court's analysis in
Ring has admittedly created considerable uncertainties, the decision has un-
doubtedly reasserted the spirit of the Sixth Amendment into the reformation of
capital punishment schemes. If the United States continues to tolerate an in-
creasingly criticized capital punishment system, the Court should require that a
jury decide the factual requisites necessary to impose man's most severe pun-
ishment in all cases. The Court has the opportunity to apply Ring to those sen-
tenced without adequate Sixth Amendment protections. By applying Ring ret-
roactively, the Court provides a remedy to defendants sentenced by a judge's
378 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976).
379 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
380 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
381 See id. at 609.
382 See TUROW, supra note 377, at 10, 96, 98. Governor Ryan had declared a moratorium in
2000. Id. at 10. He issued the pardons and commutations right before leaving office in January of
2003. See supra note 11.
383 See TUROW, supra note 377, at 20-21. In Pennsylvania, a state committee recommended a
moratorium to study the relationship between racial issues and the state's capital punishment
scheme. Id. While in Maryland, a one-year moratorium was actually enacted in May of 2002.
Id.; see also Sally Kalson, Moratorium on Death Penalty Urged: Study Commission Finds Wide-
spread Gender, Racial Bias in Pennsylvania Judicial System, PiTrsBURGH POsT-GAzE~rE, Mar. 5,
2003, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/localnews/20030305scopa0305p2.asp. But cf.
Dalia Sussman, No Blanket Commutation Poll: Most Oppose Clearing Death Row, ABC NEWS,
Jan. 24, 2003 (finding fifty-eight percent of Americans opposed to commutation of death sen-
tences to life imprisonment terms) available at http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/Daily
News/commutation-pol030124.html.
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conscience and continues the dialogue on capital punishment's proper role in
America's criminal justice system. Society should accept nothing less.
Daren S. Koudele*
J.D. Candidate, West Virginia University College of Law, May 2004; B.A., Kansas State
University, 2001. The author would like to thank Professor John Fliter, who provided an initial
inspiration in constitutional law, judicial processes, and the jury system. The author would also
like to express his immense gratitude to Professor Gerald Ashdown; without him, this Comment
would not have been published. Finally, the author would like to thank his friends, especially
West Virginia Law Review Research Editor Woodrow Turner, and family for all their support and
encouragement.
2004]
45
Koudele: Unraveling Ring v. Arizona: Balancing Judicial Sentencing Enhance
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004
46
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol106/iss3/11
